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In current geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses, hunger is understood as both a threat to be 
contained, resulting in an often severe social and spatial localization of food insecurity, and a 
humanitarian problem to be solved through diffuse global flows of food and other aid. The 
resulting scalar tensions demonstrate the potentially contradictory alignment of geopolitics and 
geoeconomics within processes of globalization and neoliberalization. This article examines the 
geopolitical and geoeconomic place of hunger and the hungry through a critical analysis of the 
food-for-work (FFW) approach to combating hunger. FFW programs distribute food aid in 
exchange for labor, and have long been used to plan and deliver food aid. While debate continues 
as to whether and under what conditions FFW programs are socially and economically just, 
governments, international institutions, and NGOs tout them as a flexible and efficient way to 
deliver targeted aid, promote community development, and improve long-term prospects for 
economic development and food security. In the post-9/11 period, FFW programs are also cited 
as effective deterrents to terrorist recruitment strategies, while development and food security 
more broadly have been incorporated into national security strategies, especially but not only in 
the United States. The food-for-work approach attempts to resolve the scalar contradictions of 
hunger through the imposition of a labor requirement that disciplines the threat of the hungry 
while enforcing global connection. Case studies of FFW programs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and 
Indonesia illustrate this contradiction, and highlight the development and possible future of 
approaches to hunger under neoliberal geopolitics. 
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Despite decades of international efforts to eradicate chronic hunger and malnutrition, the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2008, 6) stated in its most recent global food insecurity 
report that over 923 million people were chronically hungry in 2007. This figure represents an 
increase of 75 million more hungry and undernourished people over the 2003–2005 period, and 
demonstrates the severity of the global food crisis that began in 2007 with skyrocketing fuel and 
food costs. This crisis put hunger and the global food system at the forefront of political attention 
around the world. At the same time, development and food security have become central parts of 
national security and geopolitical strategies, attempts to salvage and even extend the 
liberalization of international agricultural trade continue, and aid agencies both public and 
private search for new paradigms and modalities of aid delivery. The confluence of these trends 
presents a pressing need for an examination of hunger and the hungry in modern geopolitical and 
geoeconomic discourses. These portray hunger as a political, economic, and social threat to be 
contained through an often severe social and spatial localization of food insecurity, and as a 
humanitarian and logistical problem to be resolved through diffuse global flows of food and 
other aid. The resulting scalar tensions reverberate from the bodies of the hungry to national 
security strategies to international markets and back again, and demonstrate the sometimes 
contradictory alignment of geopolitical and geoeconomic interests and practices across and 
between scales. 
This article submits these scalar tensions to critical scrutiny, focusing on the positioning 
of hunger and the hungry within dominant geostrategic discourses, and the role of food-for-work 
programs within these. I begin by outlining contemporary geopolitical and geoeconomic 
constructions of hunger, focusing especially on the potentially contradictory place of hunger and 
the hungry within these intertwined geostrategic logics, and the neoliberalization of food aid and 
anti-hunger strategies. The U.S. state and the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) are 
strategically central to this discussion. Although private aid has outgrown official (i.e., state) 
assistance, food aid and anti-hunger strategies are anchored to official assistance programs, of 
which those administered by the U.S. and the WFP are the world’s largest and most important. 
The global food aid architecture remains attuned to U.S. interests and strategic priorities and the 
WFP’s brand of expertise and humanitarianism. Understandings of and approaches to hunger 
outlined by the U.S. government and the WFP present a suitable if incomplete proxy for making 
generalizations about the place of hunger and the hungry in dominant geopolitical and 
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geoeconomic discourses and practices. 
I next examine the food-for-work (FFW) approach to combating hunger in this strategic 
and geographical context. FFW programs operate by distributing food aid in exchange for labor, 
typically on public works and infrastructure projects, and comprise a key modality for 
programming and delivering food aid. They are used extensively by the WFP and NGOs 
implementing U.S. food aid, and are touted as a cost-effective, flexible, and socially just use of 
food aid to achieve improved food security, development progress, and enhanced national 
security, all of which are connected quite directly in official national security strategies and 
discourses (White House 2006). Because these claims are open to debate, FFW programs present 
a useful case for examining the position of hunger and the hungry as geopolitical threats. Further, 
because agricultural trade has been increasingly liberalized, exposing food security and 
household subsistence to market logic and global volatility, hunger and the hungry have also 
achieved geoeconomic importance, as impediments and threats to neoliberalized global flows of 
food commodities. The hungry make potentially disruptive moral and political claims that 
impinge on trade openness and the treatment of food as a commodity like any other (McMichael 
2003; Young 2004). The food-for-work approach attempts to resolve the scalar tensions of 
contemporary hunger through the imposition of a labor requirement that disciplines the threat of 
the hungry while enforcing global connection. 
I rely on three case study examples of WFP- and U.S.-backed FFW programs, in 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, to demonstrate the development of the FFW approach 
within contemporary geostrategic discourses and practices. These cases comprise not only three 
specific and strategically important moments in the evolution and deployment of the FFW 
model, but also the more general historical and geographical development of neoliberal 
geopolitics and its mapping of hunger and the hungry. The first case, Bangladesh’s national FFW 
program, illustrates how FFW was both a vehicle for and an impediment to the early 
development of neoliberal geopolitics in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Ethiopia example 
highlights the transition between the primacy of geopolitics and geoeconomics at the end of the 
cold war and into the period of the Washington Consensus. The final case, an urban FFW 
program in Jakarta, Indonesia, demonstrates the reassertion and articulation of geopolitical 
concerns alongside the geoeconomic. These concerns are tied to fears of terrorism, fragile states, 
and underdevelopment in the period just before and since 11 September 2001 (hereinafter 
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“9/11”), and the place of hunger, the hungry, and civil society in these. I conclude by considering 
the problems FFW poses for humanitarian institutions and the hungry in the context of the 
ongoing development of neoliberal geopolitics and geoeconomics. 
 
Placing Hunger and the Hungry 
In a September 2008 speech before the Women’s Foreign Policy Group in Washington, 
the executive director of the WFP, Josette Sheeran (2008, 2), stated that “[w]ithout food, 
societies become breeding grounds for instability, civil unrest, terrorism and demagogues. We 
have learned that food is not just a soft power issue but also a hard power issue.” Such 
statements have become de rigueur in both official and popular discussions of hunger and food 
insecurity. These position hunger as part of a broader terrain of poverty and underdevelopment 
on which social and political ills “breed,” a contingent but potent precondition for disorder and 
turmoil (USAID 2005a; Karon 2008; Brown 2009; U.S. Department of State 2009; see also 
Boland 2000; Falcon and Naylor 2005). Hunger provides space and leverage for warlords, 
terrorists, and dictators to manipulate or control the hungry and vulnerable, and to influence 
regional stability and international interests. For this reason, hunger (and poverty more generally) 
is not to be addressed with “soft power” alone (e.g., food aid and development assistance), but 
also with “hard power,” the threat and use of physical force, particularly to the degree hunger is 
potentially enmeshed in wider networks of terrorism, criminal activity, and political 
manipulation. Even as Sheeran (2008, 13) outlined in the remainder of her speech an approach to 
combating hunger relying almost entirely on soft power mechanisms, she reiterated the notion 
that a fate worse than hunger waits in the wings, arguing that without immediate action, “we risk 
ceding the field to extremist groups that do not share the values of liberty, freedom, and human 
dignity.” 
This statement provides an indication of the place hunger holds, and has held, in the 
geostrategic imagination of key policymakers, international institutions, and development 
practitioners. Combating hunger meets both humanitarian and geopolitical objectives, preserving 
the rights, dignity, and wellbeing of the individual and preserving international order and 
domestic peace. On the other hand, failure to alleviate widespread and chronic hunger gives rise 
to geopolitical disorder and humanitarian crises, simultaneously undermining rights and stability. 
The standard approach to eradicating hunger and improving food security globally that has 
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emerged over the last three decades has emphasized protecting and enhancing the “entitlement 
bundle” of the poor and food insecure, including access to available food and the means to 
procure it, as well as other capabilities, commodities, networks, and access points that 
individuals and households can command (Sen 1983, 1999; Watts 1983, 2000; Watts and Bohle 
1993). 
Huish (2008, 1390) points out that the concomitant policy consensus on food security has 
emphasized the management of risk and vulnerability in access to and availability of food, 
though this approach “has a long way to go in creating broader structural changes” in either the 
globalizing food system or the political and economic mechanisms that protect and expand 
entitlements.1  Failure to enact such structural changes means that “current academic definitions 
of food security continue to use the policy language of accessibility,” while many critics of food 
security and the global food and development aid architecture have moved into discussions of 
food sovereignty and food justice (Huish 2008, 1392; see McMichael 2003; Allen 2008; Rosset 
2008). Such a shift provides fertile ground for making connections between food justice 
movements in the developing world, where concerns over land rights, access to food, and 
peasant livelihoods and cultures are paramount, and those in the developed world, especially 
those focused on environmental sustainability, urban planning and poverty in relation to food, 
and food system localization (Koc et al. 1999; Winter 2003; Wekerle 2004; Levkoe 2006; 
Guthman 2008; Pudup 2008; Jackson, Ward, and Russell 2009). 
Within this increasingly vocal and well-organized consensus on the necessity and 
urgency of food justice and democracy remain important distinctions between vulnerability, 
hunger, and the hungry in different places. As Kearns and Reid-Henry (2009, 556) argue in 
examining the relationship between discourses of biopower, bioethics, and the “politics of life 
itself,” and the uneven structuring of life chances and “vital geographies” that occurs through 
associated political economic practices and institutions, “the value of life in some places is 
predicated on the non-value of life elsewhere.” While acknowledging the crudeness of this 
observation, they employ it to focus calls for social justice on the geographical conditions that 
structure and limit vitality and life opportunities. Kearns and Reid-Henry (2009, 559) 
demonstrate how the deep politicization of life conditions and knowledges (e.g., regarding 
health, terrorism and violence, or food and hunger) demands operationalization, which “involves 
particular sorts of spatial ordering and control,” including “confinement of individuals in place,” 
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or interventions into places and bodies which open them to broader networks of calculation, 
control, and order. As Young (2004, 14) points out in analyzing food security’s uneven footing 
within neoliberal globalization, evidence strongly confirms that food security in the Global South 
has been “compromised by the exposure to volatile world prices and reduced domestic food 
production.”  The intensive neoliberalization of food systems over the last two decades has thus 
entailed a fundamental restructuring of food security, resulting in greater vulnerability to hunger 
and a severe geographical reordering of life chances for the hungry. 
This reordering falls particularly hard on the vulnerable and hungry who find themselves 
in geostrategically undesirable and dangerous locales. In a world populated by terrorists and 
other extremists, dominant geostrategic discourses assert that justice, sovereignty, and security, 
as well as food entitlements commanded by the poor, are threatened by ideological capture and 
political manipulation. Hunger’s presence as a manifestation of vulnerability represents both the 
actual existence of risk to geopolitical order, and the failure to appropriately manage or control 
such risk, with potential repercussions across the entire world economic and political system. 
Accordingly, localized hunger presents a global threat and must be contained geographically and 
socially. The positioning of hunger as a wellspring of terrorist and criminal danger and a basis 
for geographical differentiation, allows the categorization of hungry people and places as threats 
to stand in for a more thorough analysis of the intertwined dynamics of hunger, poverty, and 
instability in a world defined increasingly by economic interdependence and connection. 
Here the difference between geopolitics and geoeconomics presents a basis for analyzing 
contradiction in contemporary anti-hunger discourse and practice. Sparke and Lawson (2007, 
318) argue that geoeconomics and its “assumptions about the need to position communities most 
competitively” in a globalizing economic and social system defined more by networks of 
knowledge, trade, and investment than by strict central state territorial control, has become “a 
newly dominant mode of articulating and mapping the global–local interface in political 
discourse.” In this articulation of global–local connection, geoeconomics contrast and mesh with 
geopolitics, though seeing the former as purely economic and the latter as purely political would 
oversimplify both. A primary concern and objective of geoeconomics is “building international 
partnerships that advance ‘harmonization,’ ‘efficiency,’ ‘economic leverage’ and ‘growth’ 
against the supposed threats of political ‘radicalism,’ ‘anachronism’ and ‘anarchy’” (Sparke and 
Lawson 2007, 316). The particular projects, networks, and discourses associated with 
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contemporary geoeconomics, particularly the pursuit of neoliberalized regulatory and trade 
regimes, are profoundly politicized. These are typically juxtaposed against alternative networks 
and arrangements constituting disorderly and anarchic regimes disconnected from the logic and 
direction of the “entrepreneurial elites” and experts that populate consulting firms, state 
institutions, including security apparatuses, and corporations. 
Sparke (2007, 340) argues, therefore, that while both geopolitics and geoeconomics are 
forms of geostrategic discourse, and co-exist and often reinforce one another in specific but 
sometimes untenable ways, “the imaginative geographies of geoeconomics differ from those of 
geopolitics because they enable the imagination of an expanding economic flatness … offering a 
hope of transcending the divisions and correcting the failures” emphasized and acted upon by 
geopolitics. This critical attention to coeval but competing geostrategic discourses should be 
applied to the specific issue of global hunger. It is the potentially contradictory tension between 
different geostrategic mappings of hunger and the hungry, and the particular programs and 
strategies called upon to simultaneously resolve this tension and combat hunger, that presents a 
useful locus for investigation, and for constructing alternative geostrategic discourses and 
practices. Indeed, the prevailing geoeconomic view of hunger presents a rather different image 
than the geopolitical. Geoeconomically, hunger comprises a failure of state and markets to 
adequately protect poor individuals’ entitlements, with appropriate solutions reliant on the 
“proper” functioning of both markets and civil society within and across scales. Hunger thus is 
best addressed through openness to global economic flows, facilitated by state action, 
implemented by NGOs and other private organizations, and resulting in well-supplied markets 
connected to global networks of capital, trade, technology and expertise (U.S. Congress 2008; 
Lugar 2009).2 
The neoliberalization of development aid, agricultural production and trade, and food 
security and entitlements, are influential processes shaping contemporary geoeconomics and its 
intersection with geopolitics. Contentious debates about the neoliberalization of food and 
development aid are ongoing, and hold the potential for disrupting currently dominant practices 
and institutions directing food aid and food security policies. Such debates stem from disputes 
over the appropriate scale of food procurement and provisioning, demonstrated by persistent 
divisions within and around the WTO regarding further liberalization of agricultural trade, and 
recent efforts to reduce or end the monetization of U.S. food aid, “the sale of food aid on local 
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markets in developing countries to generate funds for development projects” (Murphy and 
McAfee 2005, 29).3 Geoeconomics as a strategic discourse shaping the character and content of 
global-local connections is not totally or necessarily neoliberal, but is facilitated by a neoliberal 
imagining of the world as a flat surface of connection, and by the material neoliberalization of 
such connection (Peck 2001a; Castree 2006). As Roberts, Secor, and Sparke (2003, 887) argue in 
identifying “the intellectual importance of studying how neoliberal marketization dynamics are 
hybridized and supplemented by various extraeconomic forces,” those outside the globalizing 
economic system (whether by choice or circumstance) become potential risks, presenting 
important sites of convergence and contradiction in geostrategic imaginaries and practice. 
The geographies of hunger and anti-hunger resulting from the hybridization of 
contemporary geoeconomics and geopolitics must be understood as embodied and not just 
theoretical visions of a world order never put into practice. The production of hunger necessitates 
embodiment of what is otherwise an abstract, universalist rendering of a particular condition of 
existence that is the product of multiple complex material processes. Hunger as an abstract object 
of control, aid, and development lacks sufficient heft to be useful in actual development 
programming. To truly “combat” hunger, as anti-hunger and various development and food aid 
programs attempt to do, hunger must be embodied as a real condition present in the lives and 
relations of actual people. This may seem quite obvious, since hunger does not exist outside of 
the hungry, but such embodiment presents difficulties because the threat of hunger as 
geopolitical and geoeconomic risk is also embodied in the hungry. Combating and solving 
hunger may therefore trample or constrain rights, disrupt or curtail entitlements, or expose the 
hungry to processes, flows, and relations that produce or exacerbate aspects of their vulnerability 
other than hunger. 
It is equally important here not to treat hunger and the hungry as products of ironclad 
laws of physical nature (i.e., the effect of insufficient production rooted in environmental 
scarcity) or social nature (i.e., the result of essential moral or social defects such as laziness, 
greed, or rent-seeking behavior). Doing so would ignore the production of hunger and the 
hungry, and the vital spaces they inhabit and make, as structural features of the worlds made 
through geostrategic discourses (Kearns and Reid-Henry 2009). Hunger has been a constant in 
human societies, and the hungry have appeared in virtually every historical period in various 
forms and numbers, with widely divergent claims on social consumption and consciousness. 
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Hunger and the hungry as objects of contemporary political control specifically in need of 
neoliberalized and securitized forms of aid, expertise, and connectivity, however, do not predate 
neoliberal geopolitics. In other words, hunger may be universally observable (geographically and 
historically), but this does not mean it is experienced the same way in every place or time, or that 
it always the result of processes unbounded from time, space, and the constraints of dominant 
geostrategic discourses that condition its social context. Under neoliberal geopolitics, the hungry 
are represented as suffering from social and economic disconnectedness, unable to exercise 
entitlements, and prone to political and social unrest. This mapping of the hungry as vulnerable, 
potentially threatening bodies is completed by the geographical production and reproduction of 
those places in which hungry bodies reside. As Orzeck (2007, 504) argues, the specifically 
capitalist production of the body as a contradictory site for fixing both sameness and difference 
in the pursuit of accumulation is analogous to the uneven development of capitalism across 
space, so that “[j]ust as capitalism requires the ability to leverage different spaces against one 
other, so too does it appear to require the ability to leverage different bodies—all of which have 
been equalized just enough to be vulnerable to differentiation—against one another.” The 
production, reproduction, and mapping of the hungry under neoliberal geopolitics, as bodies and 
spaces marked by a condition both universal and differentiated, demonstrate this tendency well. 
It is crucial in this context to historicize anti-hunger strategies and discourses, with 
particular reference to the ways in which they map hungry people and places onto and through 
geostrategic discourses. Again, it is important not to simplify geoeconomics to its contemporary 
neoliberal form, or geopolitics to the current focus on controlling risks posed by terrorists, rogue 
states, and non-integrated places and populations. While such foci loom large in contemporary 
anti-hunger strategies, these have also developed and often remain rooted in institutions and 
modalities built from past geostrategic discourses and practices. The tensions between 
overlapping, residual, and emergent geostrategic mappings shape the potentially contradictory 
processes highlighted here. Hunger, like “disease, asylum seekers, transnational crime, [and] 
terrorism,” poses “ill-defined, geographically diffuse threats … all ostensibly linked through a 
global web of risk,” provoking similarly contradictory reactions that pull in opposing but unified 
directions, one universalizing and one differentiating (Hyndman 2007, 367). Universalizing 
reactions typically seek openness and economic connection, facilitated by free trade and global 
distribution of food aid, while differentiation occurs through the sociospatial confinement of 
 9 
hunger and the disciplinary localization of the hungry. Such opposing reactions are underwritten 
by the mobilization of fear. Risk is thus “managed on the one hand through neoliberal policies of 
aid and trade that engender security and prosperity and on the other through policies of 
securitization built on tropes of threat that inculcate fear” (Hyndman 2007, 368). 
In the geostrategic discourses that form the corpus of neoliberal geopolitics, fear and 
securitization, translocal connection and economic prosperity, universality and differentiation, 
appear side by side as mutually reinforcing and imminently necessary, with contradictory 
tensions ignored, displaced, or resolved through force. The hungry both have moral standing as 
humans with an inalienable right to the conditions of existence, and present threatening examples 
of the failures of geopolitics to adequately assess and manage risk and vulnerability. A particular 
scalar tension thus lies at the heart of resulting attempts to address the threat of hunger and the 
hungry under neoliberal geopolitics: Namely, the geoeconomic solution of greater openness to 
flows of food commodities and aid does not neatly fit with a geopolitical response emphasizing 
sociospatial containment and disciplining of the hungry. USAID (2005a), for example, has 
suggested that reducing vulnerability to global economic shocks that may affect food prices and 
livelihoods should be the focus of aid, rather than simply improving aggregate food security 
measures. On the other hand, the agency has also stated that the most recent global food crisis 
challenges the institutional responses used to address past crises, which “had clear geographic 
footprints, limited durations, and relatively homogenous affected populations” (USAID 2008, 7). 
By contrast, the most recent global food crisis “is less localized and rural, and therefore is having 
a broader impact” than previous crises, with civil unrest and food riots in Haiti, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Cameroon, and Peru suggesting that the food economy’s global character presents a global 
security threat as well; most problematic is the way such unrest “is increasingly manifesting 
itself in urban settings with potential national security consequences,” complicating humanitarian 
responses (USAID 2008, 8). It is therefore crucial to consider the contradictory relationship 
between global openness and local containment in geostrategic mappings of hunger. The next 
section addresses this through an examination of food-for-work programs just prior to and into 





Food-for-Work as Neoliberal Geopolitics 
Numerous modalities of food aid programming and delivery exist, but with the increasing 
dominance and pervasiveness of neoliberal geopolitics, the food-for-work (FFW) model presents 
the most useful starting point for critical analysis of shifts in geostrategic discourses and the 
operationalization of these in relation to hunger and the hungry. This is not due to the 
overwhelming prevalence of FFW within food aid programs, nor is it the by-product of an all-
encompassing and seamless application of neoliberal ideology to food aid and anti-hunger 
strategies. Rather, I concentrate on the food-for-work approach because it most clearly reflects 
and enacts the contradictory tension between geoeconomic and geopolitical logics, presenting a 
useful vehicle for re-evaluating the relationship between deservedness, rights, and hunger, and 
offering opportunities for countering neoliberal geopolitics. The food-for-work model operates 
on the principle of disbursing food aid in exchange for labor, usually on infrastructure and public 
works projects, and predates the current period of neoliberalization. Indeed, the workhouses of 
early industrial Britain functioned on the principle of food-for-work, as did many British famine 
“relief” programs in colonial India, as the impoverished and starving were granted food relief on 
the condition of hard labor, which they were typically unfit to perform because of the debilitating 
effects of starvation (Davis 2001; Vernon 2007). Contemporary iterations of FFW are not as 
brutal as these examples, and are seen as ideal for addressing the needs of the poorest and most 
food insecure because of such programs’ “self-targeting” mechanism. FFW programs are 
designed to attract only those who cannot find work elsewhere, or who need immediate food 
assets, though this is dependent on “the (low) quality of subsidized foodstuff, queuing to receive 
transfers, or a work requirement that carries a high opportunity cost of time for the relatively 
better-off” (Barrett and Maxwell 2005, 144). 
Payment of wages in the form of food aid supposedly meets this requirement, though 
setting wage rates for specific FFW projects remains difficult. Barrett and Maxwell (2005, 144) 
point to ample evidence “that many nonpoor participate in FFW schemes,” due to 
inappropriately high wage rates, or planning, supervisory, and distribution structures that 
encourage undue influence and control by local elites. Even though, as Edkins (2000, 94) 
explains, “FFW is not intended as a substitute for other means of local employment and should 
never compete with the local labor market,” in practice such division is difficult to enforce. 
Edkins (2000) argues, however, that FFW’s popularity is due less to the concrete and practical 
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outcomes of such projects in the form of better environmental management, public infrastructure, 
and lasting improvements in food security (especially since measurable outcomes are often 
modest) than to the disciplinary effects on hungry populations the FFW model produces. Despite 
the many limitations donor and implementing agencies place on project selection, the “practice 
of food for work emphasizes the need for input and commitment from the participants,” who are 
constituted through program practice and institutional relations as “unemployed and in need of 
reform,” which comes through their labor contribution (Edkins 2000, 92). 
Indeed, the fact that the hungry have their immediate food needs met through the 
expenditure of labor on projects chosen, planned, and organized through the institutional 
networks of power and expertise that plan and deliver food aid is crucial. As Edkins (2000, 92) 
notes, no small part of “the enthusiasm for food for work programs on the part of donors arises 
from the assumption that otherwise people would sit around doing nothing.” FFW thus works in 
two ways, first constructing a hungry population in need of a particular form of intervention that 
both alleviates their hunger and provides gainful economic opportunities, and second by creating 
the necessity for a bureaucratic administrative structure to program, implement, calculate, 
supervise, and monitor this intervention (Edkins 2000, 97; cf. Essex 2009). FFW programs 
deployed under the rubric of neoliberal geopolitics therefore also require the deeper involvement 
in geostrategic discourse and practice of what de Waal (1997, 3-4) calls the “humanitarian 
international,” or “the cosmopolitan elite of relief workers, officials of donor agencies, 
consultant academics” and others propagating “the humanitarian worldview.” The widespread 
state offloading of aid programming and delivery to NGOs and other non-state humanitarian and 
development institutions, in conjunction with the prevalence of fears of networked risks like 
terrorism, environmental and epidemiological catastrophe, and general political disorder, alerts 
us once more to the unevenness structured into life chances and, specifically, the operation of 
FFW. The coupling of humanitarian with geostrategic concerns about the way hunger sets 
conditions for the “instability, civil unrest, terrorism and demagogues” outlined by WFP director 
Sheeran indicates that the threat the hungry pose, and that donors envision, is not indolence. 
Rather, the most problematic underlying threat is political challenge, from both the hungry 
themselves and the institutions charged with identifying and managing them, highlighting the 
contradictions and limits of neoliberal geopolitics and the uneven impact of its contradictions. 
 12 
The old adage that “idle hands are the devil’s tools” thus seems more apt as a description of 
donor attitudes and fears. 
Given that many donors and implementing agencies view FFW as a useful way to 
incorporate local and recipient input, to clearly target aid and reduce waste and graft, and to 
provide badly needed food assets to the poorest and most vulnerable, while also circumventing 
efforts by terrorists and demagogues to manipulate the hungry, it is important to examine the 
prevalence of FFW within aid delivery. Surprisingly, comprehensive statistics are in short 
supply. Shaw and Clay (1993, 226) cite a 1990 study stating that in FY 1989, the U.S. 
programmed 15 percent of its primary food aid budget (PL 480 Title II, or Food for Peace) as 
FFW, with two-thirds going to Asia (especially Bangladesh, see below), the Middle East, and 
North Africa, and the remainder to Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Use of FFW within 
U.S. food aid programs is dependent in part on the decisions of those agencies contracted to 
implement aid budgeted and allocated by state institutions (primarily USAID and the Department 
of Agriculture), although the tangled web of international civil society and private voluntary 
groups involved in the aid process makes accounting difficult. Scattered evidence from 
secondary sources and official reports indicates that the U.S. government views FFW as a useful 
and efficient means to combat hunger in isolated rural areas and post-conflict situations (Garst 
and Barry 1990; Anderson 1999; USAID 2005b). Similarly, the WFP cites food-for-work as one 
of its primary and most successful modes of aid delivery, particularly in areas where markets 
function poorly. Former WFP head James Ingram (2007, 15, 17) argues that FFW’s greatest 
benefits are the “strong welfare component” they include, and “the dynamism unleashed by 
[specific WFP] projects,” which produce and draw on the “enthusiasm and pride of the poor in 
their accomplishments”; he concludes by noting that within WFP’s projects, the “hand-out 
mentality was entirely absent.” 
Returning to the central question, what then makes food-for-work particularly amenable 
to neoliberal geopolitics?  I argue that three primary structural features of contemporary FFW are 
key: first, the decentralized nature of its programming and implementation; second, its heavy 
reliance on international civil society in delivery; and finally, the emphasis on the labor of the 
hungry poor to spark development. In general, FFW lightens the burden on governments, as they 
offload anti-hunger, infrastructural development, and employment policy to civil society and 
international donors, rather than directly confronting specific segments of hungry, often unruly 
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populations seeking cash work, political rights, and other entitlements. FFW programs funded by 
international donors and managed in a decentralized manner by international NGOs allow 
governments to avoid the messy and costly tasks of food distribution to disparate work sites 
populated by hungry citizens who may make political claims of state officials and institutions 
(Papanek 2004). In addition, the FFW model allows for a measure of discipline over the hungry 
poor not usually found in other food aid programs, and does so through the ostensibly impartial 
and market-oriented self-targeting mechanism described above. 
Generally speaking, then, FFW serves both geoeconomic and geopolitical ends, but 
cannot long do so without a mapping of the hungry based in two related but contradictory 
tendencies. The first is the tendency toward global connection, in which the hungry are 
incorporated into global flows of expertise and food aid, giving them a necessary but subordinate 
geoeconomic position within the global agro-food system. The other is the tendency toward 
sociospatially constraining discipline via wage-poor and highly localized labor systems based on 
imported food aid, the reinforcement of local social hierarchies, and an aid response emphasizing 
the potential threat posed by the hungry. This threat stems from the risk to systemic order 
embodied in the political and economic rationality the hungry poor exercise (i.e., supporting 
movements and groups that can answer their entitlements needs and claims, including radical and 
extremist ones), and their vulnerability to manipulation by forces outside precise calculation and 
control, including economic, political, and even environmental forces. In a period of both global 
market integration and globally networked threats and risks, the hungry are the embodiment of 
neoliberalization’s failure to predict and control such networks adequately, in a system of 
universal rational calculation and flat, open connectivity. The hungry poor demonstrate the 
inability of neoliberalized market systems to provide basic needs through free markets alone. 
FFW programs, based on globally networked market rationality and backed by locally-
constraining discipline imposed through heavily institutionalized international systems of food 
aid, development expertise, and geopolitical force, are therefore a perfectly neoliberal response 
to hunger fraught with potentially destabilizing contradictions. They promise the fulfillment of a 
universal right while imposing new differentiations of geographically constrained and cash-poor 
labor markets on the landscape of hunger. 
The neoliberal response to hunger does not imply, however, that the hungry poor and 
implementing NGOs desire or that they easily acquiesce in this contradictory system; nor does it 
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mean that the tendency toward contradiction between geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies is 
always and everywhere realized. Indeed, FFW can provide much-needed food resources to 
hungry people, and under certain conditions can be successful in promoting food security among 
the very poor and vulnerable. In other instances, though, it reinforces existing social hierarchies, 
reproducing poverty and relative vulnerability, and disrupts both existing labor markets and 
relations and local systems of food production and procurement (Lappé et al. 1998; Barrett and 
Maxwell 2005). Likewise, FFW introduces the possibility of geopolitical differentiation and 
micromanagement in the relationships between NGOs, donor institutions, and recipient 
populations. I now turn to three case studies of FFW in action, in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and 
Indonesia, to show the evolution of this anti-hunger strategy in U.S. and WFP practice alongside 
and as part of the development of neoliberal geopolitics over the last three decades.  
 
Bangladesh 
 An early example of the contemporary application of food-for-work is the national FFW 
program in Bangladesh, instituted following the famine of 1974. This famine spurred the 
development of the entitlement approach to understanding food security, stemming from the 
failure of both environmental conditions necessary for staple food production in Bangladesh, and 
the state and markets to provide for the basic needs of the poor and vulnerable. In the famine’s 
wake, the Bangladeshi government established a large-scale FFW program, implemented 
through partnership with external agencies, to provide food across rural Bangladesh using 
foreign aid. The FFW program continues today, although its emphasis is no longer primarily on 
relief but on long-term development, and it is part of the wider Public Food Distribution System 
(PFDS) within Bangladesh. More broadly, the PFDS operates to provide food to poor 
households, to distribute food in emergency and disaster situations, and to stabilize agricultural 
markets and incentivize domestic grain production (Ahmed et al. 2004, 42). While Ahmed et al. 
(2004) note that Bangladesh reduced the size of PFDS and its FFW component in the early 
2000s, to enhance cost-effectiveness and correct for grain losses and leakage (i.e., unauthorized 
use or sale of food commodities to be distributed), PFDS and the FFW program remain in place 
as vital parts of the agricultural sector and poverty-reduction strategies in Bangladesh. FFW 
participants were (and continue to be) paid in rice and wheat, most of which is imported through 
various food aid channels, and they work on a variety of rural infrastructure projects. In addition, 
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the program provides seasonal work to participants in rural areas who might otherwise go 
through several months of slack time during the dry season (January–April) with unstable 
income; in years of bad or low harvest, the FFW program fills such gaps in income and bolsters 
household food security (Ahmed et al. 1995). 
 My goal in highlighting the Bangladesh FFW program is not to examine its current 
operation, but rather to identify its particular logic as a means of both enhancing food security 
and promoting rural development in its initial decade and a half of implementation. As one of the 
largest and most important FFW programs, the Bangladeshi case demonstrates the importance of 
the FFW model in the early transition from a developmentalist approach to food security that 
drew heavily on state direction and geopolitically inflected flows of aid, to a neoliberal approach 
seeking to shed or reduce the scope of bureaucratic and geopolitical imperatives in favor of 
geoeconomic concerns with market liberalization and agricultural competitiveness. The early 
experience of the Bangladesh program demonstrates the difficulty faced in pushing neoliberal 
rollback in the context of mass poverty and food insecurity, the entrenched power of class-
relevant elite groups within the Bangladeshi state tied to international aid agencies, and the 
continued preeminence of geopolitical concerns among donors, most importantly the U.S. The 
program’s development underscores the structural struggles and tensions that arose with the 
emergence of neoliberal geopolitics as existing models of food aid were incorporated into or 
made vehicles for neoliberalization. Such tensions were due to the difficulty of uprooting 
existing forms of elite power, institutionalizing new entitlements for the poor and hungry amid 
deep impoverishment and relatively weak state and civil society organization, and the novelty of 
neoliberalism as an emergent discursive formation shaping international food aid. The 
Bangladesh program constituted an institutional setting through which the tensions between 
complementary but competing geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses of hunger were worked 
out. The difficulty of this dialectic helped further develop neoliberal geopolitics, and food-for-
work’s place in it, in other contexts, despite its incomplete manifestation in Bangladesh. 
 The key issue for this analysis is the geographic aspect of the FFW program’s early 
operation, particularly the way in which geostrategic logics and practices of local confinement 
and global connectivity were combined. The WFP and the international NGO CARE, the latter 
working on behalf of USAID, administered FFW projects, which were implemented in 
conjunction with three agencies of the Bangladeshi government—the Water Development Board, 
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the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, and the Local Government and Engineering Bureau 
(Ahmed et al. 1995, 51). An extensive study of the FFW program’s operation, conducted in the 
early 1980s by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Bangladesh 
Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), noted that while the program had been successful in 
improving short-term food security and agricultural productivity in rural areas of the country, 
selection, design, and management of specific FFW projects remained problematic, particularly 
due to a lack of resources for local governments, which were vital in effective project design and 
implementation (Ahmed et al. 1985a, 95–96). Maintenance of completed projects and continued 
stability in rural incomes and food security were unlikely with inadequate funding and resources 
provided by central government, and the report suggested that local resource mobilization with 
matching funding was the only viable solution, dependent in turn on decentralization of 
operations (Ahmed et al. 1985a, 97). 
 A technical assessment of project management also noted widespread issues with land 
acquisition and underpayment of participating workers (ranging from 2 percent to as much as 24 
percent underpayment, depending on the implementing agency and project type), while there 
were also differences between workers and local elites in perceptions of project utility (Ahmed et 
al. 1985b, 3–6). A later study of FFW program performance indicated that while local rice 
millers and dealers, military officials, and government procurement handlers all obtained large 
rents from their position relative to the FFW and related food subsidy programs in Bangladesh, 
international actors, especially USAID and the World Bank, also hampered FFW program 
effectiveness by “pressing the government to reduce expenditures on food subsidies” (Adams 
1998, 85).4  Ahmed et al. (1995, 55) identifies similar problems with the FFW program, 
especially the undue influence of local elites relative to poorer participants, and “the fact that 
food-assisted development programs [were] being isolated institutionally from the mainstream 
development effort.” The former is a function of social status reinforcing uneven connection to 
national and international networks of expertise and food, while the latter represents a structural 
problem resulting from the government’s desire to keep food aid separate from broader national 
planning, linked to rent-seeking behavior. Such difficulties remain apparent in more recently 
initiated FFW programs, as discussed below. The key point here is that in the first ten to fifteen 
years of the Bangladesh FFW program, it became both a vehicle for promoting global 
connectivity (itself increasingly shaped by the logic of global economic efficiency and reduction 
 17 
in state expenditures on social programs), and an institutional roadblock to full acceptance of 
neoliberalization (by entrenching rent-seeking and pre-existing elite networks, and 
institutionalizing entitlements in the context of deep poverty and widespread hunger). In this 
process, the emergent neoliberal geopolitics shaping FFW programs today began to take shape, 
but were limited by the fetters of humanitarian and cold war geopolitics and the inability fully to 
overcome tensions between localization and globalization. 
 
Ethiopia 
 Food-for-work programs have been used extensively in East Africa, particularly in 
Ethiopia, where donating and implementing agencies prefer FFW’s self-targeting mechanism 
amid political instability and the institutional thinness of markets. During the early 1970s, and 
again in the early to mid-1980s, Ethiopia experienced prolonged drought, meager harvests, and 
severe widespread hunger. The famine of 1972–1974 resulted in the overthrow of Emperor Haile 
Selassie, followed by several years of infighting until a Marxist-Leninist government friendly to 
the Soviet Union was cobbled together under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1977 
(Shepherd 1985, 5). Although this government made gains in literacy and health services and 
operated an efficient system of rural feeding centers, it also prioritized arms deals with the 
Soviets, to fuel wars against neighboring Somalia and rebels in the country’s north, over rural 
development and agricultural production improvements. During the mid-1980s famine, U.S. 
policy used food aid as a geopolitical weapon by denying aid to achieve broader geostrategic 
goals, with the Reagan administration citing the Mengistu government’s Soviet alliance as 
grounds for withholding aid to Ethiopia. By fiscal year 1984, the USAID request for food aid to 
Ethiopia was down to nothing, “despite warnings that millions of Ethiopians were starving and 
that the nation needed 400,000 tons of emergency food aid” (Shepherd 1985, 6). In geostrategic 
terms, the place of the hungry in this context was dependent primarily on the geopolitical 
position of the government that ostensibly held sway over them. Within the domestic politics of 
U.S. food aid policy, the Reagan administration led conservative forces seeking to cut aid 
generally, viewing it as wasteful at best, and at worst as potential assistance to America’s 
ideological enemies. Such was the case presented against American aid to Ethiopia, as many 
feared that aid delivered would not be distributed to the hungry, but would pay for Soviet arms 
shipments instead (Shepherd 1985, 6).5   
 18 
 By mid-1985, however, the U.S. was sending hundreds of millions of dollars in food aid 
to Ethiopia, though this bilateral aid came at the expense of U.S. assistance to multilateral 
agencies, such as WFP and even the World Bank, working in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa, 
and signaled the development of “a strictly American initiative toward Africa based on free-
market and growth-oriented policies” (Shepherd 1985, 8). de Waal (1991) notes that after 1985, 
the U.S. briefly became Ethiopia’s largest aid donor, though virtually all such aid was routed 
through NGOs rather than through the Ethiopian government due to legal restrictions on 
providing aid to countries that nationalize U.S.-owned assets. de Waal (1997, 124) argues 
persuasively that the Ethiopian famine of the mid-1980s was a product of military dictatorship 
and brutal counter-insurgency military campaigns, with aid delivered in the context of a “fast 
deregulating charitable market,” undermining both accountability and effectiveness. The 
Mengistu government routinely channeled food aid to militias fighting secessionists in Tigray 
and Eritrea, while international relief agencies, donors, and the military dictatorship worked to 
depoliticize the famine, highlighting environmental and population factors rather than forced 
resettlement and military offensives, and ignoring the widespread manipulation of aid (de Waal 
1991, 1997). 
More than an aberration in the operation of international food aid, famine relief and 
subsequent food and development assistance to Ethiopia indicate a broader geostrategic shift 
occurring in the final years of the cold war and immediately after. This shift signaled a more 
robust development of neoliberal geopolitics, enforcing some forms of global connectivity while 
devaluing and blocking others by finding mutually reinforcing ways of combining geopolitical 
and geoeconomic objectives. Central to this strategy was the geoeconomic structure of the 
agricultural economy relative to emergent neoliberal ideals of trade liberalization and property 
rights, which the U.S. was beginning to emphasize alongside cold war geopolitical concerns and 
practices. Meanwhile, many other agencies, including WFP and several international NGOs, 
continued to operate in Ethiopia throughout the mid-1980s famine and to utilize a variety of 
models to distribute food aid, including food-for-work. WFP set up Africa’s largest FFW 
program in Ethiopia in 1980, using food payments to slow or reverse environmental degradation 
through reforestation, land terracing, and improvements to agricultural and grazing lands 
(Humphrey 1998, 6). With the military government’s fall in 1991, and the cold war’s end, the 
geopolitical aspect of aid to Ethiopia was recast, and a new Ethiopian government sought to 
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reorganize food aid distribution amid intense neoliberalization in development policy and 
practice. In 1993, Ethiopia adopted its National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Strategy, 
which “states that no able-bodied person should receive gratuitous relief,” including a non-
specified but widely accepted principle “that 80% of food aid should be distributed through food-
for-work” (Humphrey 1998, 3).  
 A wide literature has now developed on the effectiveness of FFW programs resulting 
from this strategy, often focusing on project outcomes and success rates in meeting project 
criteria. Humphrey (1998, 9) argues that such studies have neglected two important questions, 
especially in examining the large WFP program: First, why have such studies excluded “the 
wider impacts of the [FFW] project on the lives of beneficiaries” in project assessment? Second, 
how should future evaluations approach the inclusion of such concerns? The answer to the first 
question, she argues, lies in the cost and time constraints faced by donating and implementing 
agencies, such that assessment emphasizes “those [project] features that are more easily 
quantified” rather than specific impacts on beneficiaries’ social lives, which are “generally 
intangible and inherently subjective when weighed against the costs” (Humphrey 1998, 28). The 
answer offered, and which the Ethiopian government has incorporated into its selection, design, 
and monitoring process for FFW projects, has been to increase local participation in all stages of 
project completion. This practice conforms to Edkins’s (2000) assessment of FFW projects in 
Ethiopia and neighboring Eritrea, highlighting the importance of techniques regarding both 
quantification and local participation as justifications for FFW expansion. 
 While stating that FFW programs seem to have reduced vulnerability to periodic food 
shocks, Quisumbing and Yohannes (2004, 7–10) note that in practice, FFW programs in Ethiopia 
have nonetheless experienced problems with haphazard application of administrative criteria 
regarding community and project selection, spreading needed aid too thinly, and the timeliness 
and mode of payment to participants. They also highlight gender differences in FFW project 
operation in Ethiopia, and underscore the fact that FFW is a form of “workfare,” although they 
do not critique such programs as emblematic of neoliberal labor market regulation in the fashion 
of, for example, Peck (2001b) and others reviewing regulatory restructuring in Western contexts. 
Quisumbing and Yohannes (2004, 43) conclude that “despite directives to target women or to 
ensure women’s control of the food entitlement in FFW operations,” the labor market created 
through this model of food aid delivery “does not appear to be more ‘fair’ than the wage labor 
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market in general.” They therefore argue for more attention to women’s participation and needs 
in project design and food entitlement use, as well as an increase in food-for-training programs 
rather than continued over-reliance on projects requiring manual labor. 
 For this analysis, the geostrategic relevance of FFW in Ethiopia lies in the way it 
demonstrates the historical shift from early forms of neoliberal geopolitics in the 1980s, which 
increasingly saw the hungry as equally but contradictorily important to cold war containment 
strategies and proxy wars and in unleashing global market forces via economic liberalization, to 
a manifestation that emphasized the geoeconomic over the geopolitical following the cold war’s 
end and the widespread adoption of neoliberal prescriptions in food aid and development policy. 
The strategic combination of containment and connectivity rationalizes the differentiation of the 
hungry in their position as universal general labor. This rationalization is achieved through 
FFW’s disciplinary logic of labor force attachment and incorporation of the hungry into national 
and international networks of bureaucratic measurement, food aid, and institutional expertise. 
This strategy also more fully enrolls civil society institutions working across many scales in the 
geostrategic logic and structures of neoliberal geopolitics, as states began to offload 
programming, delivery, and monitoring of food aid and other development assistance functions 
to NGOs and other private voluntary organizations. With the more recent post-9/11 reassertion of 
geopolitical concerns with underdevelopment, terrorism, and state failure, the character of FFW 
within and as part of neoliberal geopolitics has evolved once more, to include national security 
and anti-terror objectives.  
 
Indonesia 
 The financial crisis that gutted national economies across Southeast Asia in 1997–98 
provoked fears of political turmoil among observers and state officials in that region and Western 
governments, with the crisis heightening the vulnerability of poor and food insecure populations 
and creating conditions for the spread of radical Islamism and other insurgent and popular 
movements. Such fears were especially acute in Indonesia, where riots rocked Jakarta in May 
and November 1998, and the neoliberal gains made under Suharto seemed in danger as his 
dictatorship destabilized in the face of economic collapse. As one security strategist bluntly put 
it, Indonesia faced the “prospect of large numbers of ill-fed urban unemployed being 
manipulated by different political factions and provoked into large scale conflict” (Kelly 2003, 
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11). It was in this context that a multi-year, USAID-funded FFW program was established in 
Jakarta, to provide food, employment, and infrastructural development in urban and periurban 
slum areas, and to help preserve Indonesia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic position in the wider 
network of neoliberal geopolitics. This FFW program resituated not only hunger and the hungry, 
but also international civil society, in relation to U.S. imperial power just prior to and 
immediately after 9/11. The discursive and strategic place of the hungry, and of FFW as a model, 
are here dominated by two sets of concerns. First are the geoeconomic concerns with 
neoliberalization in Indonesia and Southeast Asia and the maintenance of what Glassman (2005) 
identifies as the subimperial relations that sustain the Indonesian state. Second are the 
geopolitical fears, articulated by state actors in the U.S. and Indonesia, regarding the spread of 
terrorist networks amid conditions of hunger, poverty, and economic and political crisis. 
 The hungry in Jakarta were visible within the framework of a solidifying and expanding 
neoliberal geopolitics to the extent that they posed a threat to neoliberal order and American and 
Indonesian imperial relations, a threat that became increasingly potent and real as the poor rioted 
and pressed claims for food entitlements, economic relief, and political change against the 
Indonesian state. Positioning the hungry as a geopolitical threat has long been a foundational 
feature of major anti-hunger and food aid programs, but the Jakarta case illustrates as well the 
geoeconomic threat the hungry poor represent. Their claim to entitlements to meet the needs of 
social and material reproduction unfulfilled by both volatile liberalized markets and the 
neoliberal state, the hungry poor embodied the failure of neoliberal geopolitics to adequately 
predict and manage the risks produced by openness and global connection. Likewise, the 
response to the demands and needs of the hungry poor in Jakarta’s slums was increased global 
connection through the FFW program, which incorporated them into global networks of 
development expertise and food aid, while also sociospatially confining the threat posed by 
establishing or strengthening local labor markets, thereby reducing the need for further labor 
migration. These labor markets were demarcated along lines set by international donors and 
NGOs, and made food aid distribution dependent on participation in them. In doing so, the role 
of international civil society as a mediating force in the relationship between political society and 
the hungry poor was deepened even more (Essex, 2009).  
 The FFW program itself, which began as an emergency program in 1999 but later 
transitioned to a more development-focused rationale, achieved relative success in building and 
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improving a variety of health and sanitary infrastructural projects in some of Jakarta’s poorest 
districts, and is rather different from the rural projects discussed in the two cases above because 
of its urban setting (Mercy Corps 2005). Development progress and enhanced food security 
achieved through this program are due largely to the on-the-ground work of the implementing 
NGO, Mercy Corps, which sought to sidestep some of the problems faced by other FFW 
programs, such as co-option by local elites, insufficient input from participants, and inadequate 
maintenance of completed projects. In this respect, the FFW program succeeded in establishing a 
potential foundation for both enhanced food security and community cohesion, a difficult 
objective in slums where many residents are recent migrants with few of the extended networks 
they relied upon before migrating to Jakarta. 
 The urban context of this program, however, highlights the geopolitical and geoeconomic 
purposes it is meant to serve by the donor agency, USAID, which has both development progress 
and American national security as its driving objectives. The dispersed rural settings of most 
other FFW programs do not present the kind of concentrated and more readily translocal threat 
posed by urban populations. USAID (2005b, 14) has touted the Jakarta FFW program as a 
successful means of subverting terrorist recruitment strategies, providing employment and food 
that prevent Jakarta’s poor and hungry from taking cash payments that terrorist organizations 
dole out to new members. Preventing the expansion of terrorist support and influence—an 
ostensibly geopolitical objective—becomes the domain of geoeconomic discourse and strategy, 
enacted here through a scripting of hunger as both a motivating force for performing labor 
remunerated in food, and as the basis for a potential violent threat that is to be disciplined 
through the wage relation, itself subject to global flows and processes but distinctly contained 
within the local labor market produced by the FFW program. The Jakarta program, through its 
successful NGO-led mediation of the global-local tensions inherent in hunger’s positioning as 
both geopolitical and geoeconomic threat (and paradoxically, opportunity), suggests the role 
FFW might play in the further development of neoliberal geopolitics. 
 
Conclusion 
In their examination of the geopolitical–geoeconomic dialectic, Cowen and Smith (2009, 
44) identify ways in which emergent geoeconomic social forms have begun to eclipse the 
“geopolitical social” that had been dominant in the territorial nation-state’s mode of calculation 
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and control since the nineteenth century’s end, arguing that “private and public accumulation 
through imperial violence [are] at the core of geoeconomic social forms.” New geoeconomic 
forms are not yet fully solidified, however, as “the shape of the geoeconomic social is probably 
still a radically open question” due to multiple, competing counter claims and movements made 
in the wake of geostrategic shift and political-economic crisis (Cowen and Smith 2009, 44). 
Building from Sparke’s (2007, 339) suggestion that “it is the contrast with geopolitics that 
provides the underlying rationale for introducing the distinct formula of geoeconomics,” I have 
shown how this contrast is marked by diverse, historically contingent forms of articulation 
between the geopolitical and geoeconomic, anchored in the placement of hunger and the hungry 
in different geostrategic discourses shaped and exercised by major international food aid actors. 
The universal moral claims made by the hungry—to a basic entitlement like food, and from a 
position of victimization both structural and discrete—constitute not only a field for geostrategic 
calculation and control by states and other social agents seeking the enforced connectivity and 
sociospatial differentiation of neoliberal geopolitics, but also ground for building counter-
movements centered on, as Kearns and Reid-Henry (2009, 569) argue, life capacities and 
“human vitality as the measure of injustice.” 
In the development of contemporary geostrategic discourses and the specific institutional 
practices and forms associated with them, hunger and the hungry have most often been 
positioned as a systemic threat, to be addressed through disciplinary and humanitarian strategies 
reliant on some combination of sociospatial containment and global connection. The particular 
use of food-for-work models of food aid programming and delivery in three separate cases—
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—illustrates the development of neoliberal geopolitics 
through a focus on how geostrategic discourses have addressed the problem of hunger. In this 
development, FFW has become a strategy meant to resolve scalar tensions emerging from 
conflicts between geopolitics and geoeconomics. FFW does so by disciplining the hungry, 
incorporating them into global networks of food aid and development expertise, reinforcing local 
social hierarchies, and emphasizing both the sociospatial differentiation produced by hunger and 
the position the hungry hold as untapped (unskilled, universal, general) labor. The Bangladesh 
and Ethiopia cases, for example, demonstrate how neoliberal geopolitics developed from and 
against the cold war-dominated geopolitics of the 1970s and 1980s, in which food aid was both a 
weapon deployed by donors, especially the United States, in their quest for geopolitical position, 
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and a primary tool in the development arsenal of humanitarian organizations like the WFP. 
Geostrategic understandings of development, poverty, and hunger constituted potent ideological 
and political battlegrounds. The FFW model’s prominent place in Ethiopian aid distribution both 
before the 1980s famine, exhibited in the WFP’s environmental and development programs 
there, and as part of the neoliberalization of Ethiopian food security and aid policy following the 
military dictatorship’s end, highlights the continuities and discontinuities in the geostrategic 
place of hunger and the hungry in the post-cold war geopolitical–geoeconomic dialectic. 
The final case, the urban FFW program in Jakarta, demonstrates the reinvigorated 
geopolitical positioning of hunger and the hungry alongside the geoeconomic, and the more 
robust development of neoliberal geopolitics as a form of enforced global connectivity backed by 
political and physical force. The hungry embody the systemic threat of hunger in a world of 
volatile markets and unanswered political and social demands, and the Jakarta program’s relative 
success indicates the potentially central role FFW may hold for further refining the place of 
hunger, poverty, and underdevelopment within neoliberal geopolitics. This success has also 
meant the more complete enrollment of international civil society into the project of neoliberal 
geopolitics, as neoliberalization has entailed a general but uneven shedding of development and 
aid programming responsibility by the state, and its subsequent integration by civil society 
organizations. The latter are not necessarily or everywhere willing and able to take on the task of 
managing hungry populations, particularly as claims to food entitlements often entail political 
demands that private and voluntary organizations cannot possibly answer. 
The relative positions of the hungry, international civil society, and food-for-work are 
vital to emergent geoeconomic forms because of their ambiguous and sometimes contentious 
relationships with one another. As food and other social entitlements commanded by the hungry 
are more closely intertwined with and dependent on global geoeconomic connection and 
geopolitical containment, the tensions and contradictions between these strategic paths weighs 
more and more heavily on the most vulnerable and on those asked to program and deliver aid. In 
fact, some civil society actors (the NGO CARE International most prominently; see CARE USA 
2006) have begun to question the prevailing architecture of U.S.-dominated food aid and the 
decreased flexibility of contract relations shaped by security concerns, even as the rhetoric of 
decentralization, flexibility, and localization are embraced. The FFW programs examined here 
demonstrate, for example, that this food aid model can produce positive impacts in answering 
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immediate food resource needs, but the attendant entitlements and rights must be adequately 
recognized, negotiated, and institutionalized across and between scales, something that becomes 
increasingly difficult under the rubric of neoliberal geopolitics. Ever more urgent claims to food 
and water, to fair wages and adequate housing, and to dignity and decision-making capabilities, 
lie in stark contrast to the ability of neoliberal geopolitics to fulfill them, and are the basis for 
building effective alternative geostrategic discourses and social forms that are translocal, anti-
imperial, and socially and geographically just. 
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Notes 
1 Aside from practical considerations of specific policy and institutional changes leading to better entitlement 
protection and expansion, Sen’s foundational work on famine has come in for vigorous conceptual and theoretical 
critique. Some of this is strong but sympathetic, and focused on the political gaps in Sen’s treatment of the broad 
range of possible entitlements (e.g., Watts 2000). Others (see Nolan 1993, and Sen’s 1993 response) have been 
withering in their arguments that Sen’s approach is both ideologically and theoretically faulty, particularly in its 
treatment of famine within state socialist societies and the emptiness of entitlement as a usable concept. 
 
2 Senator Richard Lugar’s (2009) comments are representative, and were delivered on the U.S. Senate floor in 
support of the Global Food Security Act of 2009, which seeks to refocus U.S. development and food security 
strategies around agricultural productivity investment in developing countries. Lugar argued that, “Food insecurity is 
a global tragedy, but it is also an opportunity for the United States,” opening doors for investment in new 
technologies and trade while improving the global context for U.S. national security. For a commentary on how the 
act fails to address the roots of hunger and food insecurity, see Shattuck and Holt-Giménez (2009). 
 
3 Monetization provides a primary revenue stream for many NGOs, but can disrupt local markets. Many groups are 
increasingly calling instead for cash aid to support food procurement in local markets, supporting small farmers and 
bypassing the administrative overhead of aid purchased from American producers and shipped on American vessels. 
 
4 During the 1970s famine itself, however, the U.S. actually cut off food aid to Bangladesh because of the country’s 
jute trade with Cuba, which was prohibited under the conditions of PL 480 aid, demonstrating the uneasy balance 
between geopolitical and geoeconomic imperatives in aid policies (Sen 1983, 135–136). The FFW program backed 
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